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VALUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
SADIE J. KAVALIER†
ABSTRACT
Injunctive relief class actions afford victims of mass harms a chance
to sue collectively and enjoin an actor’s conduct. While the moral value
of these suits may be monumental for litigants, one procedural question
remains murky: how should courts value the amount in controversy to
determine whether the suit qualifies for federal diversity jurisdiction?
Historically, federal courts adopted one of two approaches. The
“Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach” values the amount in controversy
strictly from any monetary benefit to the plaintiff(s). The “Either
Viewpoint approach” values the amount in controversy as the higher
of any monetary benefit to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of
implementing the injunction. Naturally, the more inclusive Either
Viewpoint approach tends to result in successful removal more often
than the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. For defendants, removal to
federal court can be an incredible asset to a class action litigation.
In 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) effectively opened
federal courts’ doors to a broader array of class action suits than federal
diversity jurisdiction previously allowed. Despite this expansion, some
federal district courts have continued to apply the more restrictive
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach even in cases removed under CAFA.
This Note argues that CAFA’s text, legislative history, and underlying
policy concerns require using the Either Viewpoint approach
uniformly in CAFA class actions and suggests a congressional
amendment to require this approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Litigants in the United States wield a unique procedural technique
for bringing suit on behalf of hundreds, thousands, and even millions
of plaintiffs: the class action.1 In injunctive relief class actions, injured
plaintiffs can collectively sue to enjoin an actor’s conduct. For example,
in Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.,2 the plaintiffs
sued on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated SeaWorld
patrons harmed by the park’s “deceptive” assertion that it “cares for
sea creatures, including Orcas.”3 The plaintiffs did not seek any
monetary damages for the class.4 Instead, they demanded that
SeaWorld publish information on its website about the negative effects
of captivity on orca health.5 Even though plaintiffs did not seek
monetary damages, SeaWorld contended that implementing these
measures would cost over $5 million in lost ticket sales, retracted
sponsorships, and tarnished reputation.6 In calculating the amount in
controversy, a necessary condition to accessing federal diversity
jurisdiction,7 should the court look to the plaintiffs’ negligible
monetary benefit from the injunction or the massive losses an
injunction would impose on SeaWorld?8

1. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (describing the class action as
unique to United States jurisprudence as allowing “litigation of a suit involving common questions
when there are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder”).
2. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
3. Id. at 1159, 1167.
4. Id. at 1159. However, the named plaintiffs did seek monetary damages in their individual
capacity. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1164; see also SeaWorld’s Opposition to Motion to Remand at 12–14, Anderson v.
SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:15-CV-02172 SC)
(arguing that implementing the proposed remedy on behalf of unnamed class members would
cost SeaWorld an amount exceeding the $5 million threshold).
7. While there may be other routes to federal jurisdiction in class actions, this Note will
focus on CAFA and general diversity jurisdiction. The vast majority of class actions involve
questions of state tort or contract law, leaving few opportunities to remove for questions of federal
law. See FED. JUD. CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS 3 (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CAFA1108.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8Z3F-34BJ] (reporting that in cases removed under CAFA in its first three years, 65 percent were
contract or consumer protection cases, 32 percent were torts cases, and 3 percent did not fall into
either of those categories).
8. To qualify for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the
amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). In cases like SeaWorld
where the parties have drastically different monetary values attached to the outcome, this means
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The distinction matters a great deal in class actions removed to
federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).9
CAFA encapsulates Congress’s response to state courts’ “abuse” of
the class action mechanism exhibited in bias against out-of-state
defendants and disposition of national-scale class actions in an
individual state’s court.10 Specifically, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary noted that pre-CAFA class action rules allowed attorneys to
“game the system” by organizing a putative class to avoid federal
jurisdiction.11 Plaintiffs (and perhaps more importantly, their
attorneys) could thereby take advantage of state court judges known
for certifying questionable classes and approving massive settlements.12
This was perceived as “one of the most flagrant abuses” of the previous
class action system, wherein attorneys could “invent an injured class
and then file a national class action in a ‘magnet jurisdiction’ where the
judges are more likely to lend a sympathetic ear.”13 Concern over state
courts’ abuse of the class action mechanism figures prominently in
CAFA’s text.14
If state courts were the problem, federal courts were the answer.
Writ large, CAFA embodies congressional intent to expand federal
jurisdiction over class actions by eliminating major obstacles to
removal.15 Namely, CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class actions
with over one hundred class members,16 with at least one class member

that the method for valuing that amount in controversy can either permit or preclude federal
jurisdiction.
9. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code).
10. Id. § 2(a)(4).
11. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 10 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5.
12. Id. at 20–21.
13. 150 CONG. REC. 14,512 (2004) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd).
14. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code). The Act explicitly names “State and local courts” as abusers
of the system by keeping national cases out of federal court, demonstrating bias against out-ofstate defendants, and wrongfully imposing their binding judgments upon residents of other states.
Id. § 2(a)(4).
15. See Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil and
Grable, 8 DEL. L. REV. 157, 158 (2006) (“The heart of CAFA is its expansion of federal diversity
jurisdiction.”). Unsurprisingly, this change was not viewed as a universal good. CAFA’s
opponents who favored plaintiffs disliked the expansion because federal judges were so much less
likely than state court judges to certify a class. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 75 (2003).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
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of diverse citizenship from any defendant,17 and an aggregated amount
in controversy exceeding $5 million.18 This final provision signified a
distinct
departure
from
pre-CAFA
amount-in-controversy
requirements, which required at least one plaintiff to claim an amount
exceeding $75,000.19 Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court precedent had
previously barred aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims to meet the amount
in controversy in any class action.20 On one hand, CAFA’s claim
aggregation expands federal jurisdiction over small claims class
actions, which are classes having many members with such small claims
that bringing suit individually would prove infeasible. Conversely, it
creates a puzzling question of how courts should determine the
aggregated amount in controversy in class actions demanding
injunctive relief.
Before CAFA, federal courts split on their techniques for valuing
the amount in controversy in class actions seeking injunctive relief.21
One group adopted the “Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach,” which
measures the amount in controversy strictly by the monetary benefit
the plaintiffs would receive from the injunction.22 The other group
adopted the “Either Viewpoint approach.”23 The Either Viewpoint
17. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). This provision is subject to further provisions allowing for
discretionary or mandatory remand to state court if over one-third of class members are citizens
of the forum state. Id. § 1332(d)(3). Judicial discretion depends on whether the number of in-state
class members exceeds two-thirds of the total class. Id. § 1332(d)(4).
18. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
19. See id. § 1332(a) (requiring amount in controversy of $75,000); see also Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over class actions but requiring at
least one class member to meet the $75,000 threshold).
20. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338 (holding that Rule 23 does not permit class member plaintiffs to
aggregate claims in meeting the amount-in-controversy threshold).
21. Technically, a third category values the injunctive relief from the viewpoint of the party
invoking federal jurisdiction. Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1628 (2006). However, this group remains relatively obsolete and has been
largely absorbed into the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,
595 F.2d 389, 392–93 (7th Cir. 1979) (considering the merits of applying the viewpoint of the party
invoking federal jurisdiction).
22. See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120
F.3d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that this court’s predecessor purposefully and
conspicuously adopted the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.”); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed.
Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (“The amount in controversy is tested
by the value of the suit’s intended benefit to the plaintiff.”).
23. See, e.g., Ullman v. Safeway Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1217 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The
Tenth Circuit follows the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff,
or the cost to the defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in
controversy.”).
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approach measures the amount in controversy as the greater of the
monetary benefit the plaintiffs would receive from the injunction or
the cost to the defendant of implementing the injunction.24 District
courts have consistently applied their pre-CAFA viewpoint precedent
to injunctive relief cases under CAFA, despite CAFA’s distinct
departure from prior class action rules.25
A court’s choice of viewpoint matters quite a bit in a case like
SeaWorld. There, the putative class met every other requirement under
CAFA (i.e., the class had over one hundred members and at least one
member was of diverse citizenship from SeaWorld).26 The plaintiffs
filed in state court,27 then SeaWorld sought removal to federal court
under CAFA.28 While the plaintiffs received no monetary benefit from
the putative class’s demand that SeaWorld publish information about
orcas in captivity,29 to SeaWorld the change “would more likely than
not reduce future sales by at least 16.7% . . . [plus] the value of
developing a new, viable marketing campaign.”30 Based on SeaWorld’s
$160 million in ticket revenues over the previous four years,
SeaWorld’s costs would far exceed $5 million.31 Now imagine
compounding this substantial financial exposure with a hostile state
court that is ready to certify a class and impose a costly injunction
against SeaWorld.32
Under the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, SeaWorld could not
remove to federal court. Traditional class action diversity jurisdiction
requires at least one member of the class to meet the $75,000 amountin-controversy requirement,33 but CAFA bridged this gap by allowing
aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims.34 However, SeaWorld still could not
remove to federal court under the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach
because there is no monetary benefit to the plaintiffs, and the court
24.
25.
Hall v.
2007).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1164–65 (D.N.M. 2012);
Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-0184-MJR, 2007 WL 2948405, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10,
Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1164–65.
See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558–59 (2005).
Joseph, supra note 15.
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would not consider the cost to SeaWorld. SeaWorld would thus face a
significant injunctive liability that may be further exacerbated by a
state court hostile to its interests.
The Either Viewpoint approach would allow SeaWorld to remove
to federal court. Considering both the negligible benefit to the
plaintiffs and the potential costs imposed on SeaWorld, the potential
cost to the defendant exceeds the amount-in-controversy requirement
of $5 million. This outcome aligns with Congress’s intent to expand
federal jurisdiction over class actions and allows defendants to avoid
state courts’ hostility.35
However, Congress’s failure to specify the proper viewpoint for
evaluating the amount in controversy in injunctive relief class actions
has resulted in a muddled collection of district court opinions
delivering unpredictable CAFA interpretations.36 Defendants
removing injunctive relief CAFA cases to jurisdictions that have
adopted the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach are unable to take full
advantage of the broad federal jurisdiction CAFA confers. Although
earlier scholarship acknowledges the discrepancy in federal courts’
application of these approaches,37 no author has defended a unified
approach in CAFA cases. This Note argues that the Either Viewpoint
approach best aligns with CAFA’s text, legislative history, and
underlying policy concerns, and that the Either Viewpoint approach
should be uniformly implemented by amending CAFA’s text.
Part I summarizes jurisprudence valuing amounts in controversy
in injunctive relief class actions prior to CAFA’s enactment,

35. In SeaWorld, the Court ultimately applied the Either Viewpoint approach and
determined that the cost to SeaWorld exceeded $5 million and allowed its case to remain in
federal court. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65.
36. District courts within the same circuit have issued conflicting opinions on the proper
Viewpoint in CAFA cases. See Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx),
2010 WL 11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (“The ‘defendant’s-viewpoint approach’ cannot
be used in class actions without undermining the rule that class action plaintiffs cannot aggregate
the amounts of separate claims.”). But see Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that
the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is prohibited in CAFA cases”). For more in-depth discussion of district
court decisions, see infra Part II.B.
37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Pinahs, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Injunctive Relief: Using
a “Moving-Party Approach” To Value the Amount in Controversy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1930, 1943
(2011) (explaining that the lack of congressional intent or Supreme Court guidance caused the
“lower courts [to] struggle to fashion a uniform valuation procedure.”); Steven M. Puiszis,
Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 124–
26 (2006) (noting that while CAFA eliminated the anti-aggregation principle, “[n]ot all federal
circuits follow the either viewpoint rule”).
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demonstrating the problems Congress believed warranted changing
the requirements for federal jurisdiction over class actions under
CAFA. Part II explores CAFA’s provisions that expand federal
jurisdiction to protect defendants in class actions. This Part illustrates
the necessity of implementing the Either Viewpoint approach to
ensure that defendants’ interests are fairly considered in small claims
class actions as CAFA intended, comparing this to federal courts’
inconsistent interpretation of CAFA in injunctive relief cases. Part III
demonstrates the Either Viewpoint approach’s consistency with
CAFA’s text, legislative history, and underlying policy concerns and
advocates for congressional amendment of CAFA to ensure that
federal courts use the Either Viewpoint approach uniformly.
I. PRE-CAFA CLASS ACTIONS
This Part explains class action precedent leading up to CAFA’s
enactment, including the problems Congress perceived in pre-CAFA
class actions’ frequent confinement to state court. Section A details
Supreme Court precedent barring aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims and
requiring complete diversity. Section B explores the consequences of
state court jurisdiction pre-CAFA, namely, state courts’ hostility
toward out-of-state defendants and the states’ effective creation of
national policy through their disposition of national-scale class actions.
A. Supreme Court Precedent on Claim Aggregation and Minimal
Diversity
Long before the class action entered the main stage in American
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed claim aggregation in
the landmark case Oliver v. Alexander.38 In Oliver, the Court held that
the calculation of each plaintiff’s amount in controversy “is confined
solely to his own claim . . . without any reference to the claims of
others.”39 This anti-aggregation precedent prevented plaintiffs from
aggregating their claims leading up to the adoption of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 in 1966.40 The Court then addressed putative class

38. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. 143 (1832).
39. Id. at 147.
40. Rule 23 provides the basis and prerequisites for bringing a suit as a class action in federal
court by certifying a class of plaintiffs. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For more on the Rule’s history and
developments, see generally Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary Rule 23! Shouldn’t We
Know You Better By Now?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (2017).
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members’ claim aggregation under Rule 23 in Snyder v. Harris.41 The
Court intervened to determine whether “separate and distinct claims
presented by and for various claimants in a class action may be added
together to provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy.”42
The Court answered no, ruling that plaintiffs could not aggregate
individual claims to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction.43
Twenty-one years later, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provided that whenever
a district court properly exercised original jurisdiction over an action,
the court would have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the
same case or controversy.”44 In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc.,45 the Supreme Court decided that § 1367’s supplemental
jurisdiction grants federal jurisdiction over an entire class whenever a
single class member met the amount in controversy,46 even over the
members who did not themselves meet the amount in controversy.47
Reasoning that § 1367(a)’s broad grant of jurisdiction applied
whenever a district court had original jurisdiction, “[t]he natural,
indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers supplemental
jurisdiction over claims by . . . Rule 23 plaintiffs.”48 Although Congress
enacted CAFA a few months before Allapattah, it did not apply
retroactively and the Court explicitly refused to analyze CAFA’s
potential impacts.49
Even after Allapattah, significant impediments remained to
securing removal. First, Allapattah held that federal courts could
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over class members only if the
district court had original jurisdiction.50 Small claims class actions that
did not have at least one member meeting the amount in controversy
could not avail themselves of supplemental jurisdiction. Per the most

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
Id. at 333.
Id. at 336.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 559.
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recently amended federal amount-in-controversy requirement,51
Allapattah effectively held that at least one class member must have a
big enough stake in the suit to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy
requirement to access federal court.
The longstanding rules of complete diversity were still in play as
well.52 Since 1806, the Supreme Court has required that every plaintiff
be a citizen of a different state from every defendant to qualify for
federal diversity jurisdiction.53 Within the class action context, this
meant that if any member of the putative class shared state citizenship
with the defendant, the class would be disqualified from federal
diversity jurisdiction. In effect, this limitation precluded any chance of
diversity jurisdiction when plaintiffs’ class definition included
individuals from all fifty states.54
To summarize, pre-CAFA, parties still had to demonstrate
complete diversity in order to qualify for federal jurisdiction.55
Additionally, class action plaintiffs could not aggregate their claims to
satisfy the amount in controversy necessary for federal jurisdiction per
Snyder.56 However, plaintiffs with smaller claims could still join a class
action under § 1367 so long as one member met the amount-incontroversy requirement.57 Functionally, this required at least one class
member to have a stake greater than $75,000 in the suit.
Let us apply this pre-CAFA precedent to SeaWorld. Even
assuming that SeaWorld had complete diversity from every class
member (a lofty assumption considering the class representatives and
SeaWorld were both California citizens),58 the case would still not
qualify for federal jurisdiction. The court found a negligible monetary
benefit to the class from the injunction, meaning that no individual

51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requiring that the amount in controversy exceed the sum or value
of $75,000).
52. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
53. Id.
54. See infra note 79, at 24 and accompanying text (explaining an Alabama case in which 20
million class members from all fifty states filed in state court).
55. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267.
56. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559
(2005).
58. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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class member had a claim exceeding the required $75,000 amount in
controversy.59 Therefore, SeaWorld would be confined to state court.
B. Pre-CAFA Class Actions in State Courts
CAFA was predated by a decade-long effort by Congress to curb
what it perceived as unfair state court class action judgments against
defendants.60 As explored further below, Congress had two primary
critiques of state courts’ management of class actions. First, it feared
that state courts were hostile to out-of-state class action defendants and
therefore rendered unfair judgments against them. Second, Congress
emphasized the national, rather than local, scope of large class action
suits, meaning they deserved consideration in a more neutral federal
tribunal.
CAFA’s legislative history is fraught with concern for state courts’
bias against out-of-state class action defendants.61 Advocates for
CAFA’s unsuccessful predecessor bills highly regarded federal
diversity jurisdiction’s protection for out-of-state defendants from
hostile state courts.62 Legislators described the condition of states’ class
action litigation in the early 2000s as “inconsistent with the
constitutional theory of providing Federal diversity jurisdiction where
there is the potential for discrimination against an out-of-state
defendant.”63 Representatives discussed the financial burden of state
courts’ treatment of defendants in class actions. Senator Orrin Hatch
described how “sympathetic local juries trying out-of-state
corporations bestow unjustified and sometimes outrageous awards.”64

59. See id. (finding that “Plaintiffs accrue no cognizable monetary benefit from this
injunction”).
60. See Puiszis, supra note 37, at 115 (describing congressional acknowledgment of abusive
class action claims within securities regulation starting in 1995).
61. CAFA’s legislative history primarily refers to non-federal courts oversimply as “state
courts” rather than explicitly encompassing all local and municipal courts. In the Committee
Report immediately following CAFA’s passage, the phrase “state court” appears 212 times, while
any variation of the word “municipal” appears only twice, neither of which refers to municipal
courts. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, 25, 83 n.4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22, 76 n.4
(using “municipalities” and “municipal” only in describing case facts or in the proper name of an
organization). Accordingly, this Note uses the nomenclature “state courts” to describe state, local,
and municipal courts that fall outside of the federal court umbrella.
62. See S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 10 (2003) (“[A]n out-of-state defendant in a state court
proceeding should have access to an even-handed federal forum.”).
63. H.R. REP. NO. 107-370, at 19 (2002).
64. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).

KAVALIER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/16/2021 11:25 AM

VALUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

711

Legislators were also concerned with cases that never even reached the
courtroom. They found that plaintiffs’ attorneys used “judicial
blackmail” to threaten huge losses to defendants, which incentivized
settlement even for frivolous claims.65 Congress viewed attorneys’
“ability to exercise unbounded leverage” over corporate defendants as
an unfair burden in large-scale class actions.66
Another concern stemmed from state courts’ allegedly lax
procedures and willingness to certify class actions. One Senate Report
noted that class actions filed within state courts increased by 1,000
percent between 1988 and 1998.67 The Report cited studies
demonstrating that certain counties were “hotbeds” for class actions
with filings disproportionate to their respective populations.68 One
such hotbed was Madison County, Wisconsin, where class action filings
increased by 3,650 percent between 1998 and 2000.69 Arguing in favor
of reform, the Report echoed concerns that “state court judges are less
careful than their federal court counterparts when applying the
procedural requirements that govern class actions.”70
These claims of state court bias were met with resistance.
Opposing legislators feared that federal judges were far less likely than
state court judges to certify a class.71 Others declared that allegations
of state court bias were “bereft of evidence.”72 Still, these arguments
against CAFA failed to present any evidence that state courts were not
biased against out-of-state defendants. Instead, CAFA’s opposition
rested baldly on the claim that Supreme Court precedent already
required due process for class action defendants.73
Perhaps the more compelling argument for increasing federal
jurisdiction over large class actions rested in their national scope.
Legislators expressed concern that federal courts “cannot assert
jurisdiction over claims encompassing large-scale, interstate class
actions involving thousands of plaintiffs from multiple states . . . and
hundreds of millions of dollars—cases that have obvious and significant
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 40 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42.
Id. at 21.
S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 14 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77–78, 127–28.
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implications for the national economy.”74 Stated more bluntly by
Senator Chuck Grassley, “[s]omething of national implication should
not be decided in one Podunk county in one State but should be
decided by our Federal courts.”75 This sentiment was raised repeatedly
by CAFA advocates.76 One speaker at a Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing noted that national class actions warranted federal jurisdiction,
even if there were no abuses against defendants in state courts.77
CAFA’s supporters argued that the national scope of some class
actions warranted federal jurisdiction under the values of federalism.78
The primary concern was state courts creating national policy: “[A]
system that allows state court judges to dictate national policy on
these . . . issues from the local courthouse steps is contrary to the intent
of the Framers when they crafted our system of federalism.”79 One
Senate Judiciary Committee Report highlighted a class action filed in
an Alabama county court against General Motors Company.80 There,
the plaintiffs claimed that class membership included over 20 million
car owners across the nation hurt by the “faulty” design of federally
regulated airbags.81 This suit begged the question: “Why should an
Alabama state court tell 20 million people in all 50 states what kind of
airbags they can have in their cars?”82
But what if a class action in Alabama truly only involved Alabama
citizens and questions of Alabama law? The above is not to say that
legislators did not consider the benefits of keeping some class actions
in state court. CAFA’s broad removal provisions are backstopped to
prevent removing cases that are “truly local,” such as when enough
plaintiffs are from the original filing state.83 Congress did not intend to

74. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 11 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14.
75. 150 CONG. REC. 14,369 (2004) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
76. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 14,512 (2004) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd)
(“[A]ttorneys bringing class actions can manage to avoid Federal court all together . . . even
though the total amount at stake might exceed hundreds of millions of dollars and have true multiState national implications.”).
77. Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 10
(2002) (statement of Walter Dellinger).
78. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 9 n.12.
79. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 24 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See infra Part II.B for discussion of CAFA’s exceptions for removal in cases where
enough plaintiffs are from the state court.
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strip state courts of all of their jurisdiction over class actions; rather,
Congress merely granted federal jurisdiction over cases with national
implications, leaving the remainder in state court.84 Senators who
opposed the bill in its earliest forms later approved CAFA once the
amount in controversy was raised to include only more nationally
oriented suits, the idea being that only cases of significant magnitude
warranted federal over state jurisdiction.85
Both the state court bias and national importance rationales made
it into CAFA’s text.86 In injunctive relief class actions, these arguments
are particularly relevant to ascertaining the protection Congress sought
to offer defendants by expanding federal court jurisdiction. CAFA
specifically envisioned increasing defendants’ opportunity to remove
to federal court by applying an inclusive framework. This type of
framework requires valuing injunctive relief class actions under the
Either Viewpoint approach.
II. CAFA EXPANDS FEDERAL JURISDICTION: CONSEQUENCES AND
INTERPRETATIONS
CAFA turned traditional federal diversity jurisdiction on its head
for certain class action suits. As explained in this Part, CAFA expands
jurisdiction over class actions by eliminating the complete diversity
requirement and allowing plaintiffs’ claims to be aggregated to reach
the amount in controversy. Section A reviews these provisions and
explains their significant departure from previous requirements.
Section B analyzes federal courts’ interpretations of CAFA for class
actions seeking injunctive relief, demonstrating how courts have
continued applying their pre-CAFA precedent in the face of significant
evidence that CAFA is a distinct departure from prior class action
precedent. Section C addresses how claim aggregation affects small
84. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Our concern is to
remove truly national actions to Federal court and not local controversies . . . .”).
85. For example, in supporting the amended bill, Senator Dianne Feinstein remarked:
The amended Class Action Fairness Act . . . allow[s] Federal courts to hear national
class action lawsuits . . . which involve more than 5 million in claims. I think the original
bill was 2 million. We amended it in committee to make it even bigger so we could be
sure as to the kinds of cases that would be affected.
150 CONG. REC. 14,523–24 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
86. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 4 (“Abuses
in class actions undermine the national judicial system . . . in that State and local courts
are . . . keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court [and] sometimes acting in ways
that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants . . . .”).
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claims class actions and why these suits specifically support the Either
Viewpoint approach.
A. CAFA’s Minimal Diversity and Claim Aggregation Provisions
CAFA’s purpose is to “provid[e] for Federal court consideration
of interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction.”87 CAFA primarily expands federal jurisdiction through
two mechanisms: minimal diversity and claim aggregation.
Requiring only minimal diversity departed from the traditional
complete diversity requirement established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.88
To access federal jurisdiction, every plaintiff had to be of diverse
citizenship from every defendant.89 This doctrine became particularly
cumbersome for class actions, whose membership could span all fifty
states and thereby preclude diversity jurisdiction.90 In response, CAFA
provides that federal courts shall have jurisdiction where “any member
of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant.”91
CAFA’s permissive claim aggregation also constitutes a
significant departure from prior class action precedent—in fact, it flies
directly in the face of Snyder’s anti-aggregation doctrine. Still,
Congress was explicit in its command: “In any class action, the claims
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine
whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000.”92 The Supreme Court acknowledged this departure in
Allapattah, writing in its brief section on CAFA that “[i]t abrogates the
rule against aggregating claims.”93
Claim aggregation essentially opens the federal courts’ doors to
small claims class actions in which a multitude of plaintiffs have de

87. Id. § 2(b)(2).
88. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
89. Id.; see also Danks v. Gordon, 272 F. 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1921) (“A controversy is not
between citizens of different states so as to give jurisdiction to the federal courts unless all the
persons on one side of it are citizens of different states from all the persons on the other side.”).
90. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text for one such example of a national class
action confined to state court.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 1332(d)(6) (emphasis added).
93. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571 (2005).
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minimis claims against the same defendant.94 Instead of requiring that
at least one plaintiff’s claim exceed $75,000, CAFA allows plaintiffs to
aggregate their de minimis claims to meet the amount in controversy.95
Make no mistake—while claim aggregation opens up federal
jurisdiction previously unavailable to small claims class action
plaintiffs, it also benefits defendants. Rather than being limited to state
court, defendants retain the option to remove to federal court if the
class’s aggregated claims exceed $5 million.96
In juxtaposition to these broad jurisdiction-granting provisions,
Congress also included a backstop in CAFA to keep truly local cases
within state courts. Federal district courts exercise discretion in
declining federal jurisdiction over cases where one- to two-thirds of
class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the state
where the suit was filed.97 Furthermore, federal district courts are
required to decline jurisdiction in cases where at least two-thirds of the
putative class members and the primary defendants are all citizens of
the state where the suit was filed.98 This reflects congressional intent to
only “remove truly national actions to Federal court and not local
controversies.”99 Apart from these uniquely “local controversies,”
minimal diversity is effectively defendant-friendly. Instead of limiting
a defendant to state court whenever a class member shares its state
citizenship, CAFA leaves the door open to federal jurisdiction so long
as the defendant has diverse citizenship from at least one class member.
CAFA’s provisions undoubtedly expand federal jurisdiction in
theory by requiring only minimal diversity100 and permitting claim
94. “De minimis” or “small claims” class actions are the stereotypical justifications for the
class action mechanism, because they allow plaintiffs with claims too small, logistically and
practically, to sue to band together to recover from a defendant. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d
338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 1332(d)(3). In exercising its discretion, the district court is instructed to consider the
factors listed in § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F). These considerations include the national scope of the
interests at issue and the defendant’s connection with the forum. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F).
98. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
99. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (granting original jurisdiction in class actions meeting the
amount in controversy when “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant”).
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aggregation.101 These expectations were reflected in reality: a study of
three federal district courts in the four months following CAFA’s
enactment showed a significant increase in class action filings.102
Despite this clear intent and practical effect to expand federal
jurisdiction, some defendants remain unable to access federal diversity
jurisdiction because of federal courts’ continued use of the Plaintiff’s
Viewpoint approach.
B. CAFA in Action: Federal Courts’ Interpretations in Injunctive
Relief Cases
Even before CAFA, federal courts split over the question of
injunctive relief valuation. One set—courts using the Plaintiff’s
Viewpoint approach—maintains that only the value of the suit’s
benefit to plaintiffs should be considered. The other set—courts using
the Either Viewpoint approach—contends that the value of the suit’s
benefit to plaintiffs or the cost to the defendant of implementing that
benefit should be considered.103
The Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
follow the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.104 These circuits narrowly
define the “object of the litigation” as the potential value of relief to
the plaintiff.105 These circuits have carried the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint
approach into the class action sphere.106 They cite Snyder as barring the
101. Id. § 1332(d)(6).
102. Memorandum from Tom Willging & Emery Lee, Fed. Jud. Ctr. Rsch. Div., to the
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 3 (May 22, 2006), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
CAFA0506.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCN9-ACJ7]. Naturally, this increase puts a strain on federal
courts’ dockets. Many federal judges have been hostile to CAFA removals, which some academics
believe stems from their opposition to lengthy class action proceedings in their courtrooms. See
infra Part III.B.
103. While technically some district courts have applied a third test, which values the amount
in controversy based on the value to the party invoking jurisdiction, no federal circuit court has
adopted this approach. Brittain Shaw McInnis, The $75,000.01 Question: What Is the Value of
Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1020–23, 1021 n.52 (1998). Therefore, this Note
only considers the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint and Either Viewpoint approaches.
104. Id. at 1021–22, 1021 n.52, 1022 n.53.
105. McInnis, supra note 103, at 1022.
106. E.g., DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Generally . . . the amount in controversy is calculated from the plaintiff’s standpoint . . . .”
(quoting Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972))); Morrison v. Allstate Indem.
Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000) (“For amount in controversy purposes, the value of
injunctive or declaratory relief is the ‘value of the object of litigation’ measured from the
plaintiff’s perspective.” (quoting Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns &
Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 218–20 (11th Cir. 1997))); see Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d
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Either Viewpoint approach because it would impermissibly aggregate
plaintiffs’ claims against a defendant.107 In the era of anti-aggregation
and complete diversity, this functionally meant that at least one
plaintiff had to claim a remedy valuated above $75,000.108
The First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits follow the
Either Viewpoint approach in valuing the amount in controversy for
claims demanding injunctive relief.109 These circuits define the “object
of the litigation” more broadly as the potential value of relief to the
plaintiff or the defendant’s cost of implementing that relief.110 These
circuits also adopted this approach to injunctive relief class action.111
While non-CAFA class actions do not share all of the rationales behind
the Either Viewpoint approach, this Viewpoint still appears correct in
these cases because of state courts’ bias against out-of-state defendants
and the national scope of large class actions.112 If federal courts offer a
safe haven to defendants fearing bias from state courts, it logically
follows that this jurisdiction should especially be granted broadly when
a defendant is faced with owing a sizeable judgment to many plaintiffs.
Additionally, if the defendant’s costs are sufficiently high, then the case
should be sufficiently national in scope to warrant federal jurisdiction.
Regardless, the existing circuit split serves as a backdrop to the
continued split in CAFA cases.
CAFA’s framework applies only to a limited number of class
actions meeting its specific requirements. CAFA grants federal
jurisdiction over class actions having over one hundred class
members,113 at least one class member of diverse citizenship from any
defendant,114 and an aggregated amount in controversy exceeding $5

1039, 1050 (3d. Cir. 1993) (declining to measure the amount in controversy by the costs to the
defendants).
107. See, e.g., Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050 (“In a diversity-based class action seeking primarily
money damages, allowing the amount in controversy to be measured by the defendant’s cost
would eviscerate Snyder’s holding . . . . We will not permit plaintiffs to do indirectly that which
they cannot do directly.”).
108. See supra Part I.A for an in-depth explanation of pre-CAFA class action amount-incontroversy jurisprudence.
109. McInnis, supra note 103, at 1022 n.55.
110. Id. at 1022.
111. E.g., Comm. for GI Rts. v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472–73 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
114. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
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million.115 In these few cases, district courts have fairly consistently
followed their circuit’s pre-CAFA viewpoint precedent.116 For
example, a string of district courts in the Tenth Circuit applied the
Either Viewpoint approach to CAFA suits, each using the same
language citing the Circuit’s existing precedent.117 In the Seventh
Circuit, a district court applying the Either Viewpoint approach
reasoned, “In class actions, the Seventh Circuit has determined [the
amount in controversy] ‘by looking separately at each named plaintiff’s
claim and the cost to the defendant of complying with an injunction
directed to that plaintiff.’”118 Other circuits that have used the Either
Viewpoint approach have not yet addressed the issue in CAFA cases.119
District courts in circuits that had used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint
approach have reached varying results on valuations under CAFA.
The discrepancy within the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is particularly
notable. For example, one district court recently opined that “Eighth
Circuit case law was well settled on the viewpoint issue when CAFA
was passed . . . . Thus, in line with longstanding Eighth Circuit

115. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
116. See, e.g., Parker v. Riggio, No. 10 Civ. 9504(LLS), 2012 WL 3240837, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 6, 2012) (“[T]he prevailing method of calculating value in this Circuit is the ‘plaintiff’s
viewpoint’ approach, where one calculates the value to the plaintiff, not the cost to the
defendant.” (quoting Dimich v. Med-Pro, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 517, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))).
117. See, e.g., Bailey v. Markham, No. CIV 19-0519 JB\GBW, 2020 WL 1324477, at *14
(D.N.M. Mar. 20, 2020) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit follows the
‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the cost to the
defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in controversy.”);
Ullman v. Safeway Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1217 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The Tenth Circuit follows
the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the cost to the
defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in controversy.”);
Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1163–64 (D.N.M. 2012) (“The Tenth
Circuit follows the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the
cost to the defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in
controversy.”).
118. Hall v. Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-0184-MJR, 2007 WL 2948405, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct.
10, 2007) (quoting Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir.
2002)).
119. CAFA injunctive relief valuation has not been substantively addressed in the First,
Fourth, or D.C. Circuits. A Westlaw search, WESTLAW (advanced search for: “class action
fairness act” AND “either viewpoint” AND “amount in controversy” AND injunct!), returned
no search results interpreting CAFA’s valuation of injunctive relief for district courts from the
First, Fourth, or D.C. Circuits. Additionally, Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure
does not list any First, Fourth, or D.C. Circuit cases valuing the amount in controversy in
injunctive relief under CAFA as of October 2020. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3703, at n.25 (4th ed. 2021).
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tradition, the Court will apply the plaintiff’s-viewpoint test.”120
Similarly, a district court in the Ninth Circuit held that the Either
Viewpoint approach cannot be applied to CAFA cases because the
circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint
approach.121
However, a different district court in the Eighth Circuit held that
the cost to the defendant of an injunction could be considered in
calculating the amount in controversy under CAFA.122 District courts
in the Ninth Circuit appear similarly conflicted. SeaWorld represented
one of these controversies. In SeaWorld, the court ultimately applied
the Either Viewpoint approach, holding that “the value of the
injunction-only case may be measured by the value of the injunction to
the Defendant.”123 The court found that although the putative class’s
benefit would be negligible, the cost to SeaWorld of complying with
plaintiffs’ demanded relief sufficiently satisfied the amount in
controversy to allow for federal jurisdiction under CAFA.124
District court confusion on the proper viewpoint in CAFA cases
is not limited to these two circuits. District courts in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have departed from their appellate precedent
entirely, opting instead to apply the Either Viewpoint approach to
CAFA class actions.125 Conversely, a district court in the Sixth Circuit

120. Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
June 16, 2017), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017). Although the court did aggregate the plaintiff’s
claims as required by CAFA, it decided that the suit did not warrant CAFA federal diversity
jurisdiction because the defendants did not demonstrate that the value to the plaintiffs was more
than nominal. Id.
121. See, e.g., Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx), 2010 WL
11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (“The ‘defendant’s-viewpoint approach’ cannot be used
in class actions without undermining the rule that class action plaintiffs cannot aggregate the
amounts of separate claims.”).
122. Adams v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 837, 848–49 (S.D. Iowa 2013).
123. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
see also Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling
that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is
prohibited in CAFA cases”).
124. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. at 1163–65.
125. See Bernstein v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 09-80533-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC,
2009 WL 10699864, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009) (“Under CAFA, courts are also able to
determine the amount in controversy by looking at defendant’s potential losses, including those
sustained from an injunction.”); Thompson v. La. Reg’l Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 725, 730
(E.D. La. 2019) (“The legislative history of CAFA makes clear that the amount-controversy
requirement is satisfied ‘if the value of the matter in litigation exceeds $5,000,000 either from the
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that had not previously stated its preferred viewpoint decided in a
CAFA case that it should “determine the amount in controversy from
the perspective of the Plaintiffs.”126
Few federal courts of appeals have had occasion to address
CAFA, much less in the context of injunctive relief. The courts that
have addressed CAFA injunctive relief more substantively declined to
decide on a viewpoint based on case-bound facts.127 The Second Circuit
came the closest to a resolution in DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New
York, LLC.128 There, the court merely alluded to a method of
interpretation rather than adopting one of the viewpoints. A quote in
dicta vaguely demonstrates preferring the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint
approach: “Generally . . . the amount in controversy is calculated from
the plaintiff’s standpoint; the value of the suit’s intended benefit or the
value of the right being protected or the injury being averted
constitutes the amount in controversy when damages are not
requested.”129 Still, this passage only decided whether the plaintiff had
alleged claimable damages, not whether this approach should be
generally applied in CAFA cases.130
Confused? Based on the hodgepodge of precedent listed above,
you are in good company. These confusing interpretations are
compounded by the national scope of CAFA class actions—depending
on where the initial suit is filed, defendants could be subject to
unpredictable CAFA applications. If the court decides to apply the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, defendants may be needlessly denied a
federal forum when they might have been granted removal in a
viewpoint of the plaintiff or the viewpoint of the defendant, and regardless of the type of relief
sought.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40)).
126. Houchens v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-00214-CRS, 2013 WL 5740131, at *3
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2013), rev’d, NO. 2014-CA-002017-MR, 2016 WL 4709168 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept.
9, 2016), aff’d on other grounds, 569 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2018).
127. See Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., 873 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We need not resolve
the issue of whether courts should apply the plaintiffs’ viewpoint rule or the either viewpoint rule
when determining the amount in controversy under CAFA because [defendant] did not meet its
burden under either rule.”); Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 829 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]e need not resolve the question today. Even if we were to apply the ‘either viewpoint’
approach, the more generous of the two from defendant’s perspective, [defendant] has not
satisfied a precondition for invoking the theory here.”).
128. DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006).
129. Id. at 276–77 (alteration in original) (quoting Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46,
49 (2d Cir. 1972)).
130. See id. (determining that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that the claim . . . satisfies
CAFA’s jurisdictional amount in controversy”).
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neighboring jurisdiction. These disjointed opinions confound CAFA’s
ultimate purpose of providing out-of-state defendants with an “evenhanded federal forum” to resolve disputes.131
C. CAFA’s Claim Aggregation Promotes the Social Value of Small
Claims Class Actions under the Either Viewpoint Approach
CAFA’s claim aggregation changed the landscape for one variety
of class actions in particular: small claims class actions. These are class
actions in which plaintiffs’ individual claims would be too small to
pursue costly litigation, but in aggregate, there is enough value to bring
suit on behalf of all injured plaintiffs.132 Within the context of these
suits, however, attorneys are incentivized to engage in entrepreneurial
litigation that is driven by the desire to recover fees from massive
settlements or judgments that inadequately represent plaintiffs’
interests.133 Congress recognized that these abuses were occurring
primarily in state courts and that defendants were bearing the burden
of attorneys’ entrepreneurial litigation by paying out massive
settlements and judgments rendered by state courts.134 CAFA’s claim
aggregation provision implies the Either Viewpoint approach because
it considers defendants’ stake in the litigation in deciding whether to
grant federal jurisdiction. This sentiment rings particularly true for
injunctive relief small claims class actions because the approach
balances the interests of plaintiffs in aggregating their small claims
against defendants’ interest in not being overly penalized.
CAFA’s claim aggregation encourages small claims class actions
in federal court by allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their individually

131. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 10 (2003).
132. Then-Associate Justice Williams Rehnquist summarized the premise concisely: “Class
actions . . . may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually.” Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
133. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987). Coffee offers three
main issues that plague small claims class actions: (1) “High agency costs characterize class action
litigation and permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys,” (2) “Class actions necessarily involve
asymmetric stakes,” and (3) “An initial cost differential tends to favor plaintiffs in many forms of
class action litigation.” Id.
134. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5 (“One key
reason for these problems is that most class actions are currently adjudicated in state
courts . . . where there is often inadequate supervision over litigation procedures and proposed
settlements.”).
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small claims.135 The societal benefit of small claims class actions has
long been recognized in courts.136 The literature presents two theories
explaining the societal benefit of small claims class actions:
compensationalism and optimal deterrence. Compensationalism
focuses on balancing the negative costs of entrepreneurial litigation
with the benefit of allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their otherwise
infeasible legal claims.137 Optimal deterrence theory is most relevant in
the context of CAFA injunctive relief cases because it emphasizes
imposing the maximal amount of penalty on defendants without over
penalizing them.138 As illustrated above, one of Congress’s primary
concerns in passing CAFA was state courts’ imposition of exorbitant
judgments.139 Under the optimal deterrence approach, CAFA’s claim
aggregation provision necessitates using the Either Viewpoint
approach to avoid over penalizing defendants.
1. Aggregation of Small Claims and the Optimal Deterrence
Theory. The optimal deterrence approach focuses on the optimal
deterrence of the defendant, the primary party CAFA sought to
protect. Preeminent optimal deterrence scholars Gary Friedman and
Professor Myriam Gilles propose that in determining whether small
claims class actions benefit society, “[a]ll that matters is whether the
practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs

135. This Note focuses on the value of small claims class actions due to CAFA’s permissive
aggregation of claims. Specifically, CAFA permits jurisdiction over all plaintiffs if their
aggregated claim exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Thus, small claims class actions differ
most significantly under CAFA than other forms of diversity jurisdiction because no single
plaintiff has to meet the amount-in-controversy threshold. See supra Part I.A.
136. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (“Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves
claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in
court if a class action were not available.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299
(7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class actions—and those the ones in which the rationale for the
procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”).
137. Coffee, supra note 133, at 886–88.
138. Infra note 140.
139. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
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of its actions.”140 Gilles and Friedman focus primarily on how
underdeterrence can incentivize firms to continue harmful practices.141
Analyzing the social utility of class actions through a CAFA lens
naturally requires the perspective that granting broader federal
jurisdiction purports to protect defendants rather than punish them.142
However, the optimal deterrence framework is consistent with
CAFA’s aims because it considers plaintiffs’ interest in sufficiently
deterring defendants’ wrongful conduct, while also acknowledging that
overly punitive judgments against these defendants are socially
detrimental.143 This theory depends on finding the socially optimal
level of deterrence by encouraging class actions that deter undesirable
conduct while avoiding over deterring defendants through unfair state
court decisions. In Gilles and Friedman’s words, “to deter optimally is
not to deter maximally.”144 A socially optimal class action framework
therefore promotes deterrence only insofar as it disincentivizes
defendants from harming plaintiffs.
2. The Either Viewpoint Approach Best Balances Parties’ Interests
in CAFA Injunctive Relief Small Claims Class Actions under Optimal
Deterrence. CAFA’s claim aggregation effectively opens the door to
federal jurisdiction for small claims class actions. While the $5 million
amount-in-controversy requirement guarantees that only larger cases
will be removable to federal court, CAFA’s claim aggregation
provision still enables plaintiffs with small claims to threaten massive
judgments on defendants. However, this value must be balanced with

140. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006). While Gilles and
Friedman do not attribute any value to plaintiffs being compensated for defendants’ wrongs, id.
at 107, compensationalism places plaintiffs’ recovery at the center, Coffee, supra note 133, at 886–
88.
141. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 140, at 160–61 (“[P]laintiffs may sue for injunctive
relief and damages and then collude with the defendant to settle the case for damages
only . . . . [D]efendants will pay dearly for this privilege because the injunction is what concerns
them most (since it will end their ability to continue the lucrative but unlawful practice).”).
142. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14 (“[S]tate court
judges are lax about following the strict requirements of Rule 23 . . . , which are intended to
protect the due process rights of . . . defendants. In contrast, federal courts generally scrutinize
proposed settlements much more carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural
requirements . . . .”).
143. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 140, at 157 (indicating that a corporate wrongdoer
should not “internalize more than 100% of the social costs of its actions”).
144. Id. at 155.
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the interests of the defendants; courts must still be cautious to avoid
over deterring defendants through exorbitant judgments. CAFA’s
history and grant of broad federal jurisdiction over these cases imply
that federal courts are best positioned to balance interests and avoid
over penalizing defendants.145 Effectively, CAFA implies that allowing
actions to proceed against defendants in state court constitutes over
deterring defendants.146
This reasoning applies to SeaWorld. Although plaintiffs’ claims
against SeaWorld are relatively small, together they form a significant
enough threat to the park such that SeaWorld would be motivated to
make its practices safer for Orcas. Without this threat, SeaWorld might
be underdeterred and fail to improve its practices. Conversely, over
deterring SeaWorld by imposing exorbitantly expensive injunctions in
state court may negatively impact consumers and stockholders.147
Optimal deterrence lies somewhere in between these extremes. CAFA
envisions a federal forum as best suited to weigh these interests, so it
guarantees federal jurisdiction to defendants in certain cases such that
they avoid facing an overly punitive judgment from a state court.
However, if the value of the injunctive relief sought is viewed only from
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, SeaWorld would be denied this
avenue to federal jurisdiction.
CAFA balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants in
optimal deterrence through its twofold grant of jurisdiction: plaintiffs
can aggregate claims to meet the amount in controversy, but
defendants can pursue the protection of federal court. If a district court
can refuse defendants’ removal by valuing the amount in controversy
from the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, however, defendants remain
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. This assertion presupposes that state courts are in fact biased against out-of-state
defendants, and therefore that judgments in state courts against class action defendants will be
overly punitive. While this Note supports that conclusion, some scholars argue that such bias is a
myth. See supra Part I.B for a more in-depth analysis of these competing arguments relating to
CAFA’s legislative history.
147. Notably, this characterization of optimal deterrence does imply some necessary penalty
to defendants who have incurred harm. If SeaWorld were found to have inflicted some harm on
plaintiffs, some monetary penalty would be necessary under the theory to deter them from
inflicting further harm. Accordingly, this Note does not argue against any penalization of
defendants; rather, it argues that penalties must not be so large as to over deter. CAFA’s
legislative history indicates that this overdeterrence has a net negative impact on consumers by
depressing interstate commerce. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29–30 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 29 (“[T]he Committee believes that such abuses hurt consumers by resulting in
higher prices and less innovation, and that they undermine the principles of diversity jurisdiction,
which were established by the Framers to promote interstate commerce.”).
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exposed to overly punitive judgments facilitated by state courts. The
valuation of these cases thus presents a crucial area of interpretation in
the realm of injunctive relief class actions, as explored in the next Part.
III. THE EITHER VIEWPOINT APPROACH’S SUPERIORITY
This Part demonstrates that the Either Viewpoint approach best
aligns with CAFA’s intent to broaden federal jurisdiction over class
actions. Section A explains how CAFA’s text, legislative history, and
underlying policy concerns favor the Either Viewpoint approach.
Section B addresses potential reasons why federal courts have
continued to use the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases,
despite CAFA’s significant departure from prior class action
precedent. Section C advocates for a congressional amendment
enacting the Either Viewpoint approach to ensure uniform national
application.
A. CAFA’s Text, Legislative History, and Underlying Policy
Concerns Support the Either Viewpoint Approach
CAFA constituted a significant change from previous standards
for federal jurisdiction over class actions. Because CAFA explicitly
permits aggregating plaintiffs’ claims, at least one rationale against the
Either Viewpoint approach has been eliminated. Additionally, CAFA
broadly expands defendants’ options for removal to federal court by
removing the primary pre-CAFA obstacles to federal diversity
jurisdiction.148 The SeaWorld case is instructive in this context. If
interpreting the amount in controversy in SeaWorld with the Plaintiff’s
Viewpoint approach “would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose”149
by keeping this large-scale class action out of federal court, the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach should be rejected.
CAFA’s legislative history offers insight into Congress’s intention
for courts’ interpretation of the amount in controversy in injunctive
relief CAFA cases. A Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report
explicitly advocates for the Either Viewpoint approach:
The Committee is aware that some courts, especially in the class
action context, have declined to exercise federal jurisdiction over
cases on the ground that the amount in controversy in those cases

148. Supra Part II.A.
149. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009).
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exceeded the jurisdictional threshold only when assessed from the
viewpoint of the defendant. . . . Because [§ 1332(d)(6)] explicitly
allows aggregation for purposes of determining the amount in
controversy in class actions, that concern is no longer relevant.150

Courts that have applied the Either Viewpoint approach to CAFA
cases frequently cite this section to support their interpretation.151
While the Report seems to explicitly resolve any doubt about
Congress’s intention, courts clinging to the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint
approach either ignore the Report entirely152 or deny its
persuasiveness.153 The Report was not issued until ten days after CAFA
was signed into law, which one court used to discredit its validity as a
post hoc statement entitled to little persuasive weight.154
However, these arguments ignore the supporting text in CAFA
itself: “In any class action, the claims of the individual class members
shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.”155 Pre-CAFA circuit decisions
endorsing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint rely on Snyder’s prohibition on
claim aggregation as precluding the Either Viewpoint approach.156 The
150. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42–43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40–41.
151. E.g., Rippee v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (S.D. Cal. 2005); Otay
Hydraulics, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-073570DW(VBKx), 2013 WL 1898573, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1163–
64 (D.N.M. 2012); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV-05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL
2083008, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005).
152. See, e.g., Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx), 2010 WL
11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (failing to mention the Report when dismissing the use
of the “defendant’s-viewpoint approach”).
153. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *5
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (arguing against the persuasive value of the Judiciary Committee CAFA
report in enforcing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017).
154. Id.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
156. For example, the Ninth Circuit explained,
[The] defendant’s-viewpoint approach could not be applied to class actions without
undermining Snyder . . . , in which the Supreme Court had held that class action
plaintiffs cannot aggregate the amounts of their “separate and distinct” claims in order
to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. We explained that in class actions, use
of the defendant’s-viewpoint approach was “basically the same as aggregation.”
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Snow v.
Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]n cases which involve ‘separate and distinct
claims that cannot be aggregated, it would be improper to look to total detriment. The doctrine
of [Snyder] cannot be so easily evaded.’” (quoting Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597, 599
(10th Cir. 1970))); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1
(8th Cir. 1970) (“In light of [Snyder] . . . , we are of the view that the ‘plaintiff’s viewpoint’ rule is
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Third Circuit states, “[A]llowing the amount in controversy to be
measured by the defendant’s cost would eviscerate Snyder’s holding
that the claims of class members may not be aggregated in order to
meet the jurisdictional threshold.”157 All of these cases were decided
before CAFA did in fact eviscerate Snyder’s holding by declaring that
“claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated” to reach
the amount in controversy.158 With claim aggregation explicitly
required in CAFA’s text, these courts have effectively lost their single
rationale in support of the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint. As noted in the
Committee Report, Snyder’s limitations are simply “no longer
relevant” in CAFA cases.159
The same outcome proves true in SeaWorld. The plaintiffs did not
seek any monetary damages on behalf of the class members; in fact,
“Plaintiffs clearly sought to plead in a way they thought would ensure
their case would continue in state court.”160 However, CAFA expressly
provides that the plaintiffs’ claims against SeaWorld must be
aggregated to reach the amount in controversy.161 While Snyder would
have prevented such aggregation,162 under CAFA, SeaWorld can
aggregate all of the plaintiffs’ claims against it to calculate the value of
the demanded injunctive relief. The plaintiffs’ proposed remedy would
impose substantial costs in lost ticket sales and tarnished reputation,
the value of which exceeds the $5 million threshold.163 Accordingly,
“Plaintiffs do allege a case worth at least $5 million, giving the Court
original jurisdiction under CAFA.”164
Perhaps even more convincingly than CAFA’s text and legislative
history, CAFA’s underlying policy concerns support adopting the
Either Viewpoint approach. First, the Either Viewpoint approach
the only valid rule . . . . The holding can only be interpreted as precluding the valuation of the
amount in controversy from the defendant’s viewpoint.” (citation omitted)).
157. Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach and denying federal diversity jurisdiction).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
159. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41.
160. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). If the court were to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach to
SeaWorld, aggregation would provide little benefit—even aggregated, the plaintiffs still claimed
they would derive no monetary benefit from the injunction. Supra note 4 and accompanying test.
162. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969) (holding that the claims of class members
may not be aggregated in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold).
163. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65.
164. Id. at 1165.
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protects more defendants from the bias of state courts. If CAFA truly
meant to protect out-of-state defendants from hostile state courts,
applying the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach controverts this purpose—
more defendants would be confined to state courts, even when they
face injunctions costing far greater than $5 million, so long as the
plaintiffs claim nominal monetary benefit from the injunction. This is
the exact sort of “gam[ing] the system” that Congress sought to curb.165
Under the Either Viewpoint approach, defendants facing sufficiently
expensive judgments (to the tune of $5 million) can avail themselves of
federal jurisdiction to avoid hostile state courts. Similarly, the Either
Viewpoint approach better embodies Congress’s desire to give federal
courts jurisdiction over class actions with a national footprint.166 If
district courts have the option to deny access to federal court under the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, CAFA will still not grant federal
jurisdiction to those claims having a large impact on defendants. In
effect, its purpose to expand federal diversity jurisdiction167 over
national class actions would be defeated.
Finally, the Either Viewpoint approach takes into account the
value of small claims class actions. Under the Either Viewpoint
approach, plaintiffs can still aggregate their claims to meet the amount
in controversy. At the same time, guaranteeing federal jurisdiction to
qualifying defendants under the Either Viewpoint approach ensures
that defendants are not over deterred by harsh state court judgments.
By implementing the Either Viewpoint approach, federal courts
embody the policy implications inherent in CAFA’s structure and
promote the fairness and equity rationales undergirding CAFA.
B. Counterarguments to the Either Viewpoint Approach in CAFA
Cases
The question from Part II.B remains—why have some courts
continued to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in the face of
evidence that CAFA cases should be treated differently from other
class actions? While there is no one answer, three factors may help
explain these judges’ decisions: CAFA’s textual ambiguity, continued
incorrect application of pre-CAFA class action precedent, and federal
judges’ hostility toward CAFA.
165. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
166. Supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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CAFA’s text is frequently critiqued as too ambiguous, and this
may lead courts to continue to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach
absent explicit congressional instruction. Ambiguous may be too rosy
a characterization—scholars deem the drafting “sloppy.”168 In fact,
substantial litigation has been dedicated to interpreting an unrelated
provision of CAFA that reads as entirely nonsensical.169 This slip is
emblematic of CAFA’s sloppy drafting. Although Congress did not
sloppily describe the aggregation principle, its failure to specify the
proper viewpoint for analysis permits judicial discretion in applying the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.170 Judges hostile to CAFA can thereby
interpret the statute to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach absent
explicit congressional direction.
CAFA’s ambiguity also plays into the rationale that courts have
simply (or perhaps stubbornly) stuck with their pre-CAFA class action
precedent. However, few circuit courts have had occasion to rule on
the issue—instead, district courts have issued the majority of decisions.
Notably, the only district courts that have applied the Plaintiff’s
Viewpoint approach sit in circuits that applied that approach in preCAFA cases.171 The trend of following pre-CAFA precedent seems to
follow in other areas of CAFA interpretation as well.
For example, in the context of removal, CAFA remains silent on
the burden of proof required to show that plaintiffs did or did not meet
the amount-in-controversy requirement. Absent congressional
guidance on which standard to use, courts almost uniformly applied

168. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2008); Jacob R. Karabell, The Implementation of
“Balanced Diversity” Through the Class Action Fairness Act, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 305 n.27
(2009).
169. Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution
to the Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2007).
In this provision, CAFA gives courts of appeals discretionary jurisdiction over district court
decisions on whether removal under CAFA is appropriate, but only in cases where “application
is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c)(1). If the statute is supposed to grant appeals only where a timely appeal is filed,
legislative history and common sense indicate that Congress intended to write “not more than 7
days.” Steinman, supra, at 1187.
170. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *6
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (applying the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach despite acknowledging
CAFA’s disposal of the anti-aggregation principle and the Senate Report’s explicit instruction to
use the Either Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017).
171. Supra Part II.C.
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their pre-CAFA class action precedent.172 As in SeaWorld, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have demonstrated willingness to treat CAFA cases
differently from class actions not brought under CAFA.173 However,
the remaining courts’ unwillingness to apply a different standard from
pre-CAFA class actions may explain why some courts continue to
apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach absent additional
congressional direction.
Finally, some scholars have suggested that federal judges are
generally hostile to CAFA.174 This would explain why judges continue
to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach—as the narrower standard,
it inherently favors state court jurisdiction and limits defendants’
options to remove to federal court. The suggestion that federal judges
are hostile to CAFA may have some bite, perhaps most notably in the
face of evidence that judges were reluctant to accept an increase to
their already heavy dockets.175 The day before CAFA was passed,
Congressman William Delahunt urged his fellow Representatives to
consider that “[t]he practical effect of [the bill] could be that many
cases will never be heard given how overburdened Federal judges
are.”176 Studies from the Federal Judicial Center suggest that these
concerns were well-founded: in the four months following CAFA’s
passage, the number of class action suits in the three federal district
courts the Center observed increased significantly.177
Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg’s research
proves particularly illuminating. In an empirical analysis of federal
CAFA decisions from 2005 through 2008, Clermont and Eisenberg
conclude that “[t]he set of all published opinions to date allows us to

172. Compare Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208–11 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying
the precedent of the preponderance standard); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505
F.3d 401, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006)
(same); Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804, 813–14 (5th Cir. 2007)
(same), with Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the pre-CAFA precedent
of the legal certainty standard).
173. See, e.g., Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
(ruling that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is
prohibited in CAFA cases”).
174. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 1591.
175. See 149 CONG. REC. 25,209 (2003) (statement of the Judicial Conference of the United
States) (expressing its “concerns that the provisions would add substantially to the workload of
the Federal courts”).
176. 151 CONG. REC. 2643 (2005) (statement of Rep. William Delahunt).
177. Memorandum from Tom Willging & Emery Lee, supra note 102.
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conclude that most federal judges have resisted CAFA.”178 Specifically,
they find that federal courts had noticeably high rulings in favor of
plaintiffs’ motions to remand in both the district courts179 and courts of
appeals.180 They also find that when defendants acted as appellants in
CAFA cases, judges had a significantly higher reversal rate of 37
percent.181 Clermont and Eisenberg find that this statistic “tends to
show that it is opposition to extension of CAFA, rather than any
aberrational pro-plaintiff attitude, that is driving the appellate
judges.”182 Though this Note does not attempt to recreate that data
with more modern cases, more recent legislative history suggesting
CAFA amendments show that this concern is ongoing.183 This
noticeable hostility to extending CAFA jurisdiction to defendants
provides a compelling backdrop to courts’ unwillingness to apply the
Either Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases.
In short, CAFA’s textual ambiguity regarding which Viewpoint
judges should use to value the amount in controversy leaves the door
open for them to continue using the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.
Some judges may be motivated by precedent, simply applying the
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach if precedent so dictates. Other judges
might be driven by less innocent motives. If a federal judge is already
hostile to CAFA, its textual ambiguity allows them to remand cases
back to state court. These rationales provide further ammunition to an
argument in favor of more federal intervention in the form of a
congressional amendment.

178. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 1591.
179. Clermont and Eisenberg found a two-to-one plaintiff win rate in federal district courts.
Id. at 1579.
180. A slightly lower, but still noticeably high, plaintiff win rate of 57 percent was found in
courts of appeals. Id. at 1582.
181. Id. at 1583.
182. Id. at 1584.
183. See Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on the Const., 112th Cong. 38 (2012) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (“[W]e
expressed the concern that [CAFA] would increase the workload of our already overburdened
courts . . . . And growing caseloads leave Federal judges even less time.”); State of Class Actions
Ten Years After the Enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on the Const. & Civ. Just., 114th Cong. 35 (2015) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[T]he Act
will increase the workload of our already overburdened Federal courts . . . .”). Despite this
concern, no official amendments to CAFA have been proposed or drafted.
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C. Necessity of a Congressional Amendment to Enforce the Either
Viewpoint Approach
The prior Sections have focused on the whys: why CAFA
necessitates the use of the Either Viewpoint approach and why some
courts have continued to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in
the face of that evidence. This Section will focus on the how. More
specifically, this Section will demonstrate the need for a congressional
amendment of CAFA to enforce the Either Viewpoint approach. This
need stems from the three explanations described above for judges’
continued use of the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach: CAFA’s textual
ambiguity, misapplied pre-CAFA precedent, and hostility to CAFA
cases generally.184
The amendment would be best situated within 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(6), the provision that presently authorizes claim
aggregation.185 Claim aggregation is one of the necessary conditions for
the Either Viewpoint approach, and the provision already states the $5
million amount-in-controversy requirement. Therefore, the
amendment could be appended to the existing text. An adapted version
of the Tenth Circuit’s explanation of the Either Viewpoint approach
provides a useful structure.186 Additionally, adapting the language of
existing precedent on the Either Viewpoint approach directs federal
courts that have previously used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach to
look toward circuits that have already applied the Either Viewpoint
approach for guidance. As combined with the existing text, the
amended text of § 1332(d)(6) would read,
In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be
aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The
courts shall consider the greater of either the aggregated value to the
plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of injunctive relief as the measure
of the amount in controversy.187

This amendment would effectively address each of the three
rationales for continuing to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.
First, amending the statute’s language would give explicit guidance to
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (“In any class action, the claims of the individual class
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”).
186. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
187. The added portion is italicized.
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courts on how to value the amount in controversy in these cases.
Second, statutory language describing how CAFA cases should be
treated differently from non-CAFA class actions would demonstrate
why prior precedent should not be followed. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, explicitly requiring the Either Viewpoint approach in
these cases would deny judges the discretion to oppose extending
CAFA jurisdiction to defendants.
The existing pool of precedent interpreting CAFA demonstrates
a muddled and confusing application of CAFA to injunctive relief
cases.188 While some courts have looked to CAFA’s legislative history
in applying the Either Viewpoint approach, others have disregarded
this history as unpersuasive or ignored it altogether.189 Providing
concrete guidance on the proper interpretation within the text of the
statute itself could help avoid this confusion. Because CAFA’s text,
legislative history, and underlying policy concerns demand that courts
use the Either Viewpoint approach, the most efficient and binding way
to implement it nationwide is to include the Either Viewpoint in the
text of CAFA itself.
CONCLUSION
CAFA demonstrates a significant departure from prior
procedural requirements for removing class actions to federal court.
Whether based on concerns for state courts’ bias against out-of-state
defendants or the national impacts of such litigation, the underlying
principle of expansive federal jurisdiction remains clear. CAFA’s text,
legislative history, and underlying policy concerns all show that
Congress intended to increase opportunities for defendants to remove
to federal court. The Either Viewpoint approach acknowledges the
value of the suit to the same party Congress sought to protect in
enacting CAFA: the defendant. However, district courts have
perpetuated an obstacle to federal jurisdiction by continuing to apply
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases. Courts may be
motivated by CAFA’s ambiguity, a desire to comport with their

188. Supra Part II.C.
189. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *5
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (arguing against persuasive value of the Judiciary Committee’s CAFA
report in enforcing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017); Parker
v. Riggio, No. 10 Civ. 9504(LLS), 2012 WL 3240837, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (following
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach based on Second Circuit precedent without considering
CAFA’s legislative history).
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previous non-CAFA precedent, or even outright hostility to CAFA.
Regardless of the motivation, the result remains the same—courts have
created a hodgepodge application of CAFA to amount-in-controversy
valuation that leaves defendants with unpredictable expectations in
injunctive relief cases.
The most effective resolution of this confusion would be achieved
through a congressional amendment to ensure uniform nationwide
application. In the meantime, defendants in injunctive relief cases
remain subject to the will of district court judges in deciding which
viewpoint will be used to value their claims. As in the SeaWorld case,
these determinations may make or break a defendant’s opportunity for
federal removal. The current doctrine leaves too much discretion to
federal judges to answer one of the most important questions to a
defendant in an injunctive relief class action.

